Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey: Creating a Meaningful Choice for Housing Choice Voucher Holders by Bacon, Laura
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 55 
Issue 4 Summer 2006: Symposium - Intellectual 
Property Licensing by the Dominant Firm: 
Issues and Problems 
Article 7 
Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey: Creating a Meaningful Choice for 
Housing Choice Voucher Holders 
Laura Bacon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Laura Bacon, Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey: Creating a Meaningful Choice for Housing Choice Voucher 
Holders, 55 DePaul L. Rev. 1273 (2006) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol55/iss4/7 
This Notes & Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
GODINEZ V. SULLIVAN-LACKEY:
CREATING A MEANINGFUL CHOICE FOR
HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER HOLDERS
I. INTRODUCTION
The face of public housing in the United States is ever-changing.
Today, public housing high rises in Chicago and across the country are
being torn down in favor of low-level, mixed-income communities and
the use of tenant-based vouchers.' Individuals and families can apply
to local housing authorities to participate in the Housing Choice
Voucher Program (Program), 2 but acceptance is unlikely as waiting
lists are long and often even closed.3 Some individuals and families
relocated from existing public housing units that are being demolished
or rehabilitated may opt to permanently use a voucher rather than
return to public housing.4 Those families are not subject to the regu-
lar application process and do not have to be put on a waiting list. As
the federal government contemplates cutting funding for the Housing
Choice Voucher Program, the availability of vouchers that are not a
part of a relocation plan will be further reduced.5
The problems of under-funding and unavailability of vouchers,
however, merely scrape the surface of the obstacles in administering
the Housing Choice Voucher Program. Once individuals or families
obtain a household-based voucher, many find it difficult to find an
apartment to rent.6 Much of this difficulty results from landlords in
mostly middle- and upper-class communities refusing to rent units to
potential tenants who will pay rent with the assistance of a voucher. 7
This widespread discrimination reduces the utility of the voucher pro-
gram, frustrates the purported goals of the legislation, and further
1. See Mark A. Malaspina, Demanding the Best: How to Restructure the Section 8 Household-
Based Rental Assistance Program, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 287 (1996).
2. See infra notes 27-51 and accompanying text.
3. CHAC, INC., CHICAGO'S HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM, AN OVERVIEW 11
(2001).
4. Paul Fischer, Where Are the Public Housing Families Going?: An Update 1 n.2 (Jan. 30,
2006) (unpublished report, Lake Forest College) (on file with author).
5. William Grady & Antonio Olivo, Lower Rents Could Hurt Poor; HUD May Reduce Hous-
ing Subsidies, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 27, 2004, § 2, at 1.
6. LAWYERS' COMM. FOR BETTER Hous., INC., LOCKED Our: BARRIERS To CHOICE FOR
HOUSING VOUCHER HOLDERS, REPORT ON SECTION 8 HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER DISCRIMI-
NATION 10-11 (2002) [hereinafter LCBH].
7. See id. at 11.
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compounds the problems of city redevelopment projects such as the
Chicago Housing Authority's Plan for Transformation. 8
Source-of-income discrimination is against the law in Chicago and
has been for almost ten years.9 But the Illinois Appellate Court's re-
cent holding in Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey' ° has the potential to be-
gin addressing this problem through the court's judicial affirmance of
an administrative agency's holding that source-of-income discrimina-
tion is against the law.'1 Although the holding is limited in its applica-
tion, Chicago can serve as a model for other states and municipalities
struggling with similar issues.' 2 Short of proposing an amendment to
the national Fair Housing Act, the City of Chicago's approach to the
problem is a more realistic, workable solution.' 3
Part II of this Note discusses a brief history of government subsi-
dized housing and explains why the utility of the Housing Choice
Voucher Program is becoming more important as the face of subsi-
dized government housing changes.14 Focusing on the administration
of the Program in Chicago, this Note describes the widespread dis-
crimination that does occur, as shown through various studies and re-
ports.15 It goes on to explain how source-of-income discrimination is
hindering the effectiveness of the Program and preventing it from
achieving its proffered objective-the integration of low-income fami-
lies and public housing families into mixed-income communities.16
Part III of this Note describes the facts and holding of Godinez, in-
cluding the reasons for the Illinois Appellate Court's reversal of the
circuit court's holding.17 Part IV discusses the Illinois Appellate
Court's interpretation of the City Ordinance in Godinez and asserts
that the court's holding is correct.' 8 Finally, in Part V, this Note dis-
cusses the advantages, as well as the shortcomings, of a local, legisla-
tive remedy such as Chicago's, and ultimately recommends that other
municipalities in Illinois and across the country interpret their Fair
Housing Ordinances equally as broadly, as advocated by the Illinois
Appellate Court in Godinez.19 Part VI concludes that if source-of-
8. See infra notes 227-237 and accompanying text.
9. LCBH, supra note 6, at 3.
10. Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey, 815 N.E.2d 822 (11. App. Ct. 2004).
11. See infra notes 199-237 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 238-277 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 199-210 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 21-84 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 63-84 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 85-121 and accompanying text.
18. See infra.notes 122-191 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 199-277 and accompanying text.
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income protection is increasingly added to local and state legislation,
and properly interpreted by the judiciary, the objective of the Housing
Choice Voucher Program may begin to be realized. But progress
through the law can only truly make a difference if the underlying
discriminatory attitudes change as well. 20
II. BACKGROUND
The subsidized housing policy in the United States has recently
moved from "supply-side" construction of public housing units to "de-
mand-side" mobility and voucher programs.21 The Housing Choice
Voucher Program, as it is administered in the City of Chicago, exem-
plifies this trend. 22 The objective of the Housing Choice Voucher Pro-
gram and its underlying theory are sound, but problems in the
application of the Program impede its effectiveness.2 3 One major
problem is the prevalence of source-of-income discrimination exper-
ienced by voucher-holders, as described in the case of Ms. Sullivan-
Lackey below. 24 Targeting this problem, some states have passed pro-
visions that outlaw source-of-income discrimination. 25 Similarly, the
Illinois Appellate Court held that source-of-income discrimination, in-
cluding housing vouchers as a source of income, is against the law in
the City of Chicago.26
A. Creation of the Housing Choice Voucher Program
Government subsidized housing in the United States has taken on
many forms since its inception in 1937.27 In its first decade, govern-
ment subsidized housing legislation was largely ineffective because of
strong resistance in the private real estate sector and lack of govern-
ment funding.28 Unfortunately, today-at a time when the need for
20. See infra notes 199-277 and accompanying text.
21.. Malaspina, supra note 1, at 288. The Housing Choice Voucher Program is considered a
"demand-side" program because it allows tenants to choose among existing units in the private
market, as opposed to "supply-side" programs like public housing and project-based housing
assistance programs, which directly increase the number of affordable housing units in the public
and private markets. Id. at n.4. See also infra notes 27-51 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 63-71 and accompanying text; see also LCBH, supra note 6, at 3.
24. See infra notes 67-71, 85-121 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
26. Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey, 815 N.E.2d 822, 826, 828 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
27. For a more detailed overview, see Cara Hendrickson, Racial Desegregation and Income
Deconcentration in Public Housing, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 35, 37 (2002), explaining
that the United States' first public housing program was created by the Housing Act of 1937,
Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-39 (2001)).
28. Hendrickson, supra note 27, at 37.
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government assistance may be even higher-not much has changed. 29
The proliferation of public housing high-rise constructions in the
1950s and 1960s created racially segregated, high-crime neighbor-
hoods-largely as a result of racist local housing authorities' discrimi-
natory site-selection and tenant assignment procedures.30 The U.S.
government has since struggled to correct the policy mistake that cre-
ated these neighborhoods, hoping to find a better solution. 31 The
most recent trend in subsidized housing policy relies increasingly on
mobility-based programs that allow individuals to enter the private
housing market.32
The Section 8 household-based rental assistance program (Section
8)33 began in 1974 and has grown dramatically, now becoming one of
the primary subsidized housing programs in the country.34 Recently
renamed the Housing Choice Voucher Program,35 this program is a
federally funded, "demand-side" subsidized housing program.36 It al-
lows low-income tenants37 to enter the private market and find hous-
ing of their choice, provided that the housing complies with the
29. Id. at 55-56. Budget cuts threaten to eliminate the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), and political hostility toward the Program is high. Id.
30. Id. at 44-45. See also Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. I11. 1969).
Gautreaux and its progeny represent over thirty years of litigation, which continues today, sur-
rounding the past discriminatory site selection and tenant assignment policies of the Chicago
Housing Authority. For the most recent addition, see Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority,
No. 66-C-1459, 2004 WL 1427107, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 2004). See also ALEXANDER POLI-
KOFF, WAITING FOR GAUTREAUX: A STORY OF SEGREGATION, HousING, AND THE BLACK
GHETrO (2006).
31. Hendrickson, supra note 27, at 48-52.
32. See, e.g., Malaspina, supra note 1, at 288.
33. The Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments Program was created by the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2000); Section 8 Tenant Based Assis-
tance: Housing Choice Voucher Program, 24 C.F.R. pt. 982 (2005). The initial legislation provid-
ing low-income housing assistance was passed as section 8 of chapter 896 of the Housing Act of
1937, thus termed "Section 8." 24 C.F.R. § 982.2.
34. Malaspina, supra note 1, at 288.
35. The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, § 545,
112 Stat. 2461 (1998), revised the Section 8 Program, merging the previously separate Section 8
voucher and Section 8 certificate programs into one tenant-based program called the Housing
Choice Voucher Program. In October 1999, HUD issued revised regulations to implement the
statutory merger. Housing Choice Voucher Program, 64 Fed. Reg. 56,894 (Oct. 21, 1999) (codi-
fied at 14 C.F.R. §§ 888, 982). Throughout this Note, the terms "Section 8 vouchers" and
"voucher-holders" will be used in reference to the Housing Choice Voucher Program.
36. Malaspina, supra note 1, at 294.
37. Families eligible for the Program are those "whose annual income does not exceed 50% of
the median income for the area" in which they choose to live. Id. at 299. But the local public
housing agency (PHA) is required to provide at least seventy-five percent of its vouchers to
those defined as "extremely low income." 24 C.F.R. § 982.201(b)(2)(i). A family defined as
"extremely low income" is one "whose annual income does not exceed 30 percent of the median
income for the area ...." 24 C.F.R. § 5.603(b).
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Program's requirements. 38 The Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) allocates federal funds to the local public hous-
ing agencies (PHAs) who then administer the Program locally.39
The passage of the Quality and Work Responsibility Act of 199840
furthered the trend toward tenant-based programs by encouraging the
demolition of public housing units in favor of creating mixed-income
communities. 41 The main goal of the legislation is "deconcentration-
dispersal" of poverty in public housing, to be achieved through demo-
lition of existing public housing and relocation with vouchers. 42 The
theory that concentrations of poverty serve to exacerbate its accompa-
nying social problems supports the legislation.43 The local implemen-
tation of the statute, however, results in a net loss of public housing
units." This forces a large number of families into the private mar-
ket-with or without government assistance 45-and has resulted in re-
location of families to neighborhoods that are no different than those
they moved from. 46
The City of Chicago followed this trend in national housing policy
with the announcement of its $1.5 billion Plan for Transformation in
1999. 47 This year marks the seventh year of the city's ten-year plan
"to rebuild or rehab 25,000 units of public housing. ' 48 A large part of
38. See Malaspina, supra note 1, at 287-88, 298-99.
39. See Paula Beck, Fighting Section 8 Discrimination: The Fair Housing Act's New Frontier,
31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 157 (1996).
40. The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, § 545,
112 Stat. 2461 (1998).
41. See Joseph Seliga, Comment, Gautreaux a Generation Later: Remedying the Second
Ghetto or Creating the Third?, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1049, 1083 (2000).
42. Jeff R. Crump, The End of Public Housing as We Know It: Public Housing Policy, Labor
Regulation, and the US City, 27 I, 'L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 179, 183 (2003).
43. Id. at 181.
44. Id. at 184 (citing Susan J. Popkin et al., The Gautreaux Legacy: What Might Mixed-Income
and Dispersal Strategies Mean for the Poorest Public Housing Tenants?, 11 HOUSING POL'Y DE-
BATE 911 (2000) (estimating a net loss of more than 14,000 units of affordable housing in
Chicago)).
45. Since the inception of the Plan for Transformation, rates of eviction from public housing
units have dramatically increased. See Katherine E. Walz, Staff Attorney, Nat'l Ctr. on Poverty
Law, Remarks at Panel Discussion Held at DePaul University College of Law, The Future of
Chicago's Public Housing (Nov. 15, 2004).
46. See Fischer, supra note 4, at 13. Families relocated using vouchers as a part of the Chicago
Housing Authority (CHA) Plan for Transformation have moved to areas that are "overwhelm-
ingly African-American and disproportionately poor." Id.
47. CHI. Hous. AuTH., BUILDING NEW COMMUNITIES, BUILDING NEW LIVES, SHAPING A
NEW VISION OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN CHICAGO 2 (2002), available at http://www.thecha.org/
transformplan/files/plan for transformation brochure.pdf [hereinafter PLAN BROCHURE].
48. Id. For the most recent report on progress of the Plan for Transformation and the goals
for the past and current years, see Chicago Housing Authority, Plan for Transformation, Annual
Plans, http://www.thecha.org/transformplan/plans.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2006).
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this project focuses on the transformation of previously "isolated pub-
lic housing developments into mixed-income communities. '49 The
plan requires a large number of public housing residents to be relo-
cated during the course of the project. Approximately half of this re-
location has been and will continue to be accomplished through the
use of vouchers.50 Additionally, as of June 30, 2005, thirteen percent
of residents have chosen to be permanently housed using a Housing
Choice Voucher, even after the rehabilitation or redevelopment is
complete.51
B. Overview of the Administration of the Housing Choice Voucher
Program in Chicago
The administration of the Program may vary somewhat depending
on the local housing agency, but the basic Program elements are uni-
form.52 Chicago's Housing Choice Voucher Program is administered
by CHAC, Inc. (CHAC), a private company contracting with the Chi-
cago Housing Authority (CHA). 53 CHAC accepts applications and
screens households from a waiting list to determine if they are eligible
for the Program. 54 The waiting list for the Program is currently closed
and is estimated to include 9,756 families as of June 30, 2005. 5- In
2001, CHAC estimated that the waitlist would be closed for at least
five years.56 Five years have since passed and the list remains closed.
A family receiving assistance through the Program usually pays no
more than thirty percent of their monthly income for housing.57 The
family must locate an apartment that is at or below the Fair Market
Rent (FMR) for the particular area.58 If the unit is above the FMR
49. PLAN BROCHURE, supra note 47, at 2.
50. CHI. Hous. AUTH., FY2006 MOVING To WORK: ANNUAL PLAN 71 (Oct. 31, 2005), availa-
ble at http://www.thecha.org/transformplan/plans.html [hereinafter ANNUAL PLAN].
51. Id.
52. Because the subject of this Note is Chicago's Housing Choice Voucher Program, the focus
is on the administration of Chicago's Program, but the administration of the Program in other
large metropolitan areas is likely to be very similar. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV.,
VOUCHER PROGRAM GUIDEBOOK: HOUSING CHOICE (2001), http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/
programs/hcv/forms/guidebook.cfm (including complete Program rules and specifications).
53. Fischer, supra note 4, at 1. See also CHAC, About the Housing Voucher Program (2004),
http://www.chacinc.com/voucher-program.asp; Chicago Housing Authority, Housing Choice
Voucher Program (2003), http://www.thecha.org/applyforhousing/section8.html.
54. CHAC, supra note 3, at 4.
55. ANNUAL PLAN, supra note 50, at 144. This waitlist is for the Housing Choice Voucher
Program only and does not include any individual or family using a voucher as a part of the Plan
for Transformation.
56. CHAC, supra note 3, at 11.
57. Beck, supra note 39, at 157.
58. Id.
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for that area, the family may choose to make up the difference, but its
share cannot exceed forty percent of the family's monthly income.59
If the unit meets Program specifications, including the local PHA's
safety requirements, and the owner is willing to rent under the Pro-
gram, both the tenant and the PHA will enter an agreement with the
owner or landlord. 60 The housing agency will pay a subsidy directly to
the owner on behalf of the participating family,61 and the family will
pay its share, which amounts to the difference between the subsidy
and the actual rent charged by the landlord. Upon renewal of the
lease, the unit must pass an annual inspection and the tenant must re-
certify his or her family's income to determine continued Program
eligibility. 62
C. Problems in Application
Numerous recommendations have been made to try and increase
the effectiveness of the Housing Choice Voucher Program so that it
can better achieve its proffered objective. 63 These recommendations
include: allowing more time for families to search for a unit, providing
mobility counseling and support services, conducting landlord out-
reach, and providing incentives for landlord and owner participation
in the Program.64 A bill introduced in the House of Representatives
in 2004 incorporated some of these suggestions, but focused more on
the problems of under-funding and long waiting lists.65 At best, with-
out some change, maintaining the current administration of the Pro-
gram will result in continued racial and economic isolation and
segregation. 66 At worst, the net loss of public housing units combined
59. CHAC, supra note 3, at 7.
60. Id. at 5.
61. The agreement between the PHA and the owner is called a "Housing Assistance Payment
contract," or HAP. Its duration is the same term as the lease, usually one year. Id.
62. Id. at 11.
63. CHI. AREA FAIR Hous. ALLIANCE, PUTrING THE "CHOICE" IN HOUSING CHOICE VOUCH-
ERS (PART 3), at 4-9 (2004) [hereinafter FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE]. This report was written by
the Alliance for the purpose of "[m]apping the location of Housing Choice Vouchers in the
Chicago Region [to] demonstrate the need for affirmative efforts to provide greater access to
areas of opportunity for families using vouchers." Id. at i.
64. See id. at 4-9. See generally Philip D. Tegeler et al., Transforming Section 8: Using Federal
Housing Subsidies to Promote Individual Housing Choice and Desegregation, 30 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 451 (1995); see also Hendrickson, supra note 27.
65. Fair Housing Protection Act, H.R. 4436, 108th Cong. (2004). Section three of the bill
provided for a "Plan to End Waiting Lists for Section 8 Rental Housing Assistance" and added
$20 million in funding for 2005, 2006, and 2007. The bill was last referred to the Subcommittee
on Housing and Community Opportunity. See Thomas.loc.gov, Summary, http://thomas.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR04436:@@@L&summ2=M& (last visited Mar. 31, 2006).
66. Not only does the current distribution of voucher-holders reflect broad segregation, but in
a study of 650 families that recently moved out of CHA public housing as a part of relocation,
2006] 1279
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with the difficulty of using a voucher could lead to a housing shortage
and a homelessness epidemic reaching crisis levels.
Widespread discrimination against voucher-holders seems to limit
the number of affordable units they can choose from.67 This discrimi-
nation increases in "exception rent areas" and if the voucher-holder is
Black or Latino.68 The net effect of this kind of discrimination is to
reduce the number of housing units available to voucher-holders,
making it increasingly difficult to find a place to use their government
assistance. 69 Additionally, because 96.8 percent of vouchers in Chi-
cago are held by Black or Latino households, 70 source-of-income dis-
crimination may be one contributing cause of the continued racial and
economic segregation in Chicago communities. 71
Although the Fair Housing Act of 1968 does not provide protection
for source-of-income discrimination, 72 some state legislatures have
passed broader fair housing statutes that include source of income as a
protected class.73 For the most part, this additional protection has
ninety-seven percent of them moved to communities that were over thirty-percent African
American and had over twenty-four percent of the population living below the poverty level.
See FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, supra note 63, at 3. See also generally SUDHIR ALLADI
VENKATESH, AMERICAN PROJECT: THE RISE AND FALL OF A MODERN GHE'Vro (2000).
67. See LCBH, supra note 6, at 3.
68. See id. at 10-11. See also infra notes 222-226 and accompanying text.
69. LCBH, supra note 6, at 11. The study, administered through telephone testing of land-
lords, found that forty-six percent of landlords in the general Chicago market refused to rent to
Housing Choice Voucher holders and twenty-two percent equivocated, meaning they responded
neither "yes" or "no." Id. at 9, 10-11. Of landlords in the "exception rent areas" tested, fifty-
five percent refused to accept vouchers and sixteen percent equivocated. Id. at 9. The percent-
ages were slightly higher for follow-up calls made by minority testers. Id. The result of these
findings is that of the units that are within the CHA rental payment guidelines, only thirty per-
cent are truly available to voucher-holders. Id. at 11.
70. FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, supra note 63, at 26 tbl.2A. The table reports that there are
31,829 voucher-holder households in the City of Chicago. Of those households, 26,826 are Black
Households and 3,976 are Latino Households. By dividing the total number of Black and Latino
Households (30,802) by the total number of voucher-holder households, the result is that 96.8%
of Voucher Holder Households in Chicago identify themselves as Black or Latino.
71. "The high levels of segregation" of voucher-holder households "are not explained by the
location of affordable housing, since ... affordable housing units exist throughout the region."
Id. at ii. See also Seliga, supra note 41, at 1080-83 (discussing how one of the recent Gautreaux
decisions not to extend the judgment order to include Section 8 vouchers has encouraged the
CHA to make greater use of the vouchers as a means of relocation from demolished housing
projects because the relocation does not have to be to an integrated neighborhood). See also
supra note 30.
72. The Fair Housing Act of 1968 currently protects only against discrimination in housing on
the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin," 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)
(2000), and includes other protections for handicapped persons and age discrimination. Id.
§ 3604(c).
73. William P. Wilen & Rajesh D. Nayak, Relocated Public Housing Residents Face Little
Hope to Return: Work Requirements for Mixed-Income Public Housing Developments, 38
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. Pov. L. & POL'Y 515, 525 n.54 (2004) (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE
1280
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been upheld by the state judiciaries when challenged in the course of
litigation.74  In Attorney General v. Brown,75 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held that the statutory provision protecting
recipients of public assistance, including rental assistance, prohibited a
landlord from refusing to rent to an individual solely based on his sta-
tus as a recipient of Section 8 assistance. 76 In Commission on Human
Rights and Opportunities v. Sullivan Associates,77 the Supreme Court
of Connecticut held that the state statutory protection against discrim-
ination on the basis of "lawful source of income" included Section 8
voucher-holders. 78  Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in
Franklin Tower One v. N.M.79 interpreted the phrase "source of a law-
ful rent payment" to include Section 8 vouchers.80
All three cases also held that the state statutes were not preempted
by federal law.81 These courts do not represent a unanimous view,
however, as the Seventh Circuit case Knapp v. Eagle Property Man-
agement Corporation demonstrates. 82 In that case, the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that the provision of the Wisconsin Open Housing Act
protecting lawful source-of-income discrimination did not include Sec-
tion 8 vouchers. 83 Additionally, in dicta, the court questioned whether
an alternative interpretation would be preempted by federal law. 84
§ 12955 (West 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64c (2003); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1402.21 (Lexis
Nexis 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4582 (2002); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B,
§ 4(10) (West 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West 2002); 2002 N.J. LAWS 82 (recodified
Sept. 5, 2002); OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1452 (2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.421 (2001) (exempting
Section 8 vouchers); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-21-5 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4503 (2001);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 106.50 (West 2002)).
74. See Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Sullivan Assocs., 739 A.2d 238 (Conn.
1999); Attorney Gen. v. Brown, 511 N.E.2d 1103 (Mass. 1987); Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v.
N.M., 725 A.2d 1104 (N.J. 1999).
75. Brown, 511 N.E.2d 1103.
76. Id. at 1109.
77. Sullivan Associates, 739 A.2d 238.
78. Id. at 241. The court additionally held that the state statute requires landlords to agree to
terms of Section 8 leases. Id. at 251.
79. Franklin Tower One, 725 A.2d 1104.
80. Id. at 1112-13.
81. Sullivan Associates, 739 A.2d at 245; Brown, 511 N.E.2d at 1107; Franklin Tower One, 725
A.2d at 1114.
82. Knapp v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272 (7th Cir. 1995). Although interpreting a
statute that has since been repealed, the Second Circuit in Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden
Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 298 (2d Cir. 1998), echoed this argument.
83. Knapp, 54 F.3d at 1283.
84. Id. at 1282.
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III. SUBJECT OPINION: GODINEZ V. SULLIVAN-LACKEY-ONE
WOMAN'S STRUGGLE
Ms. Sullivan-Lackey was an elderly woman, suffering from numer-
ous medical conditions.85 In April 1999, she was receiving rental assis-
tance through a Section 8 voucher, and her annual lease was about to
expire. 86 Before renewal, the Housing Choice Voucher Program re-
quires that the unit undergo an inspection to determine whether the
unit continues to comply with Program health and safety regula-
tions.87 Sullivan-Lackey's apartment failed the inspection, so in order
to continue receiving voucher rental assistance, she had to move.88
This meant she would have to find another apartment able to pass
inspection, reasonably priced in comparison to rent in the area, and
owned by someone willing to participate in the Section 8 Program.8 9
She had to do all this before her voucher expired or else she would
lose the rental assistance. 90
At the time Ms. Sullivan-Lackey needed to move, a vacancy opened
in the building where her daughter lived.91 Julio Godinez owned the
building and his son Carlos Godinez managed it.92 Ms. Sullivan-
Lackey desired this particular apartment because it was on the first
floor, suited her medical needs, and would allow her to provide for
her daughter's childcare needs.93 After Ms. Sullivan-Lackey filled out
her rental application, paid the application fee, and viewed the unit,
Carlos Godinez, knowing she was unemployed, asked her how she
would pay for the apartment.94 She replied that she would be using
her Section 8 voucher. 95 Godinez then said that he did not accept
Section 8 vouchers. 96 Because Ms. Sullivan-Lackey could not make
the rental payments without the government assistance of the
voucher, she could not take the apartment. 97 Although she continued
to look, Sullivan-Lackey's search for another unit that both accepted
her voucher and complied with Program requirements was fruitless.98
85. Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey, 815 N.E.2d 822, 825 (I11. App. Ct. 2004).
86. Id. at 824.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Godinez, 815 N.E.2d at 824.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 824-25.
94. Id. at 825.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Godinez, 815 N.E.2d at 825.
98. Id.
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She did not find an adequate unit "before the expiration of her vouch-
ers and lost her benefits" as a result.99
Two fair housing testers called the Godinezes who told them that
they did not accept Section 8 vouchers. 100 In August 1999, Sullivan-
Lackey subsequently filed a complaint with the City of Chicago Com-
mission on Human Relations (Commission). 01 The complaint alleged
"that plaintiffs [Carlos and Julio Godinez] violated the Fair Housing
Ordinance by discriminating against [Ms. Sullivan-Lackey] based on
her source of income."10 2 The City of Chicago's Fair Housing Ordi-
nance states that "it shall be an unfair housing practice ... [t]o make
any distinction, discrimination or restriction against any persopa...
predicated upon the ... source of income of the prospective or actual
buyer or tenant .... ,,103 Following a hearing and a review of the evi-
dence, the Commission issued a final ruling in July 2001.104 It held
that the plaintiffs violated the Fair Housing Ordinance by discriminat-
ing against Sullivan-Lackey on the basis of her source of income. 0 5
The Commission additionally awarded Sullivan-Lackey $5,610 in dam-
ages and $16,284 in attorneys fees, and fined the Godinezes $250.106
The Godinezes objected to the decision and filed a writ of certiorari
in the Circuit Court of Cook County "to review the administrative
findings of the Commission. ' 10 7 In June 2002, the circuit court re-
versed the finding of the Commission, holding that based on the Sev-
enth Circuit decision in Knapp v. Eagle Property Management
Corp.,108 protection against source-of-income discrimination does not
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. The City of Chicago Commission on Human Relations is the administrative body
responsible for enforcing the Chicago Human Rights Ordinance and the Chicago Fair Housing
Ordinance. See generally Chicago Commission on Human Relations, http://www.cityofchicago.
org/HumanRelations (last visited Mar. 29, 2006).
102. Godinez, 815 N.E.2d at 825.
103. Id. at 826. The Chicago Municipal Code states:
It shall be an unfair housing practice ... :
A. To make any distinction, discrimination or restriction against any person in the
price, terms, conditions or privileges of any kind relating to the sale, rental, lease or
occupancy of any real estate used for residential purposes in the city of Chicago or in
the furnishing of any facilities or services in connection therewith, predicated upon the
race, color, sex, gender identity, age, religion, disability, national origin, ancestry, sex-
ual orientation, marital status, parental status, military discharge status or source of
income of the prospective or actual buyer or tenant thereof.
Id. (quoting CHI. MUN. CODE § 5-8-030 (2003)).
104. Id. at 825.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Godinez, 815 N.E.2d at 825.
108. 54 F.3d 1272 (7th Cir. 1995).
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include protection for those receiving Section 8 benefits (i.e., voucher-
holders). 10 9 Sullivan-Lackey and the Commission appealed.110
The Illinois Appellate Court reversed, reinstating the order of the
Commission for three reasons.1 First, the precedent relied on by the
circuit court was a case interpreting the Wisconsin Open Housing
Act,112 containing a definition for "source of income" distinguishable
from the City of Chicago Fair Housing Ordinance.1 3 The Fair Hous-
ing Ordinance is broader in its definition, allowing it to include pro-
tection for Housing Choice Voucher holders. 114  Second, the
Commission had been interpreting "source of income" to include pro-
tection for voucher-holders since 1995.115 The appellate court rea-
soned: "[A] court may not overturn an administrative decision unless
the authority of the administrative body was exercised in an arbitrary
or capricious manner or the decision is against the manifest weight of
the evidence. 1" 6 In this case, the plaintiffs failed to present evidence
that they denied housing to Sullivan-Lackey on a basis other than her
intention to pay rent using a Section 8 voucher, and also failed to pre-
sent evidence indicating that participation in the Housing Choice
Voucher Program would create a substantial financial burden.117
Third, other state courts had chosen to distinguish the interpreta-
tions of their states' fair housing legislation from that in the Knapp
decision."" The court rejected Godinezes' argument that they had in-
sufficient notice to apply to the Section 8 Program and stated that
because the "[p]laintiffs chose to enter the arena of renting residential
109. Godinez, 815 N.E.2d at 825.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 830. On appeal, the court considered the decision of the administrative body di-
rectly, rather than reviewing the circuit court's decision. Id. at 825. The agency's finding is given
deference and upheld as long as it is "just and reasonable in light of the evidence presented." Id.
at 826 (citing Conklin v. Ryan, 610 N.E.2d 751 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)). Questions of law, however,
are reviewed de novo. Id. (citing Sangirardi v. Vill. of Stickney, 793 N.E.2d 787 (Ill. App. Ct.
2003)).
112. Godinez, 815 N.E.2d at 827 (citing Wis. STAT. § 101.22(6) (1994) (defining "lawful source
of income" as "includ[ing] but... not limited to lawful compensation or lawful remuneration in
exchange for goods or services provided, profit from financial investments, any negotiable draft,
coupon, or voucher representing monetary value such as food stamps, social security, public
assistance or unemployment compensation benefits")).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit considered neither the interpretation of the Wisconsin
State courts nor that of an administrative agency. Id.
116. Id. at 826 (citing O'Neil v. Ryan, 703 N.E.2d 511 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)).
117. Id. at 828.
118. Godinez, 815 N.E.2d at 828 (citing Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Sulli-
van Assocs., 739 A.2d 238 (Conn. 1999); Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 725 A.2d 1104
(N.J. 1999)).
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property," knowledge of the requirements imposed by the Commis-
sion was necessary. 119 When a Section 8 prospective tenant ap-
proaches a landlord, the Commission rulings required that the
landlord seek Section 8 certification. °2 0 Additionally, the Illinois Ap-
pellate Court held that the award of fees and costs by the Commission
was within its statutory authority.' 21
IV. ANALYSIS
Although the holding in Godinez 22 only serves to affirm the way in
which the Commission has been interpreting the Fair Housing Ordi-
nance for almost ten years, the clear reasoning and authority of the
Illinois Appellate Court lend important support for future enforce-
ability and public awareness of the law. The court applied not only
the correct legal standards, but also reached the right result. 23 By
according extreme deference to the Commission, the court adopted its
interpretation of the law and implicitly adopted its preemption analy-
sis.124 A brief consideration of the possible alternatives the court
could have reached adds further support to the strength of the court's
holding.125
A. Deference to the Commission
First, the court applied both the appropriate standard of review for
an administrative decision, and the appropriate standard for review of
the interpretation made by an administrative body responsible for en-
forcement. 26 Rather than reviewing the circuit court's decision, the
appellate court directly reviewed the Commission's decision and re-
fused to overturn it unless the decision was against the manifest
weight of the evidence. 27 Although the court noted that questions of
law are reviewed de novo, it recognized that when reviewing the inter-
pretation of an administrative agency, the agency's interpretation is
119. Id. at 829.
120. Id.
121. Id. The Fair Housing Ordinance gives the Commission authority to award "such relief as
may be appropriate" which "is not limited to an order: ... to pay actual damages, as reasonably
determined by the Commission, for injury or loss suffered by the complainant ..... Id. (citing
CHI. MUN. CODE § 2-120-510(l) (2003)). The court also stated that the Illinois Human Rights
Act gives municipalities the authority to provide broader anti-discrimination measures than
those that exist under the Act. Id. (citing 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-108(A) (West 2000)).
122. Godinez, 815 N.E.2d at 830.
123. See infra notes 126-191 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 126-153 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 154-191 and accompanying text.
126. Godinez, 815 N.E.2d at 825-27.
127. Id. at 825-26.
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entitled to more deference because of the agency's responsibility to
enforce the particular law. 128 Unfortunately this leads to an opinion
with clear conclusions, but somewhat brief reasoning.
By according the proper degree of deference to the Commission,
the court did not interfere with the necessary ability of an administra-
tive agency to interpret and enforce the law as it deems necessary.
Because the Commission's reasoning is-clear in previous opinions, 129
the court deferred to it without much elaboration.
In determining whether Section 8 vouchers are a protected source
of income, the Commission first considers the plain meaning of the
language of the Chicago Fair Housing Ordinance. 130 In the Chicago
Human Rights Ordinance and the Commission's Regulations, "source
of income" is defined as "the lawful manner by which an individual
supports himself or herself and his or her dependents.' 131 The Com-
mission has rejected the argument that anyone receiving a Section 8
voucher is not supporting himself or herself, but is being supported by
the federal government. 132 The statute's broad definition, which con-
tains no other restrictions or qualifications, does not support such a
narrow interpretation. 133 Nothing in the text of the provision indi-
cates that the drafters intended to exclude those who rely on govern-
ment assistance from protection against discrimination based on their
source of income. 134 In addition, interpreting "source of income" to
include Section 8 vouchers is consistent with the City of Chicago's
stated policy of "assur[ing] full and equal opportunity to all residents
of the city to obtain fair and adequate housing for themselves and
their families in the city of Chicago without discrimination against
them." 135
Because the Commission is responsible for enforcing the statute by
accepting complaints and issuing orders regularly, the court adopted
the Commission's reasoning. 36 The importance of a court's deference
128. See id.
129. See In re Sullivan-Lackey, No. 99-H-89, 2001 WL 1042296, at *1 (Chi. Comm'n Human
Relations July 18, 2001); In re Smith, Nos. 95-H-159, 98-H-44/63, 1999 WL 308207, at *1 (Chi.
Comm'n Human Relations Apr. 13, 1999).
130. Smith, 1999 WL 308207, at *3
131. Id. (citing CHI. MUN. CODE §§ 2-160-020(m), 5-08-040; Regulation 100(32)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
132. Id.
133. Id. at *4.
134. Id.
135. Id. at *3 (citing CHI. MUN. CODE § 5-08-010) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
136. Because it deals with the issues more frequently, an agency's decision tends to be more
informed, reflecting experience, expertise, and possibly even legislative intent. See Ill. Consol.
Tel. Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n, 447 N.E.2d 295, 300 (Ill. 1983).
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to an administrative body is highlighted by a comment made in the
Godinez brief filed in the Commission proceeding: "[I]t 'is highly un-
likely that a court of law would find a Section 8 subsidy to be a 'source
of income."1 37 This comment indicates that the author of the brief
felt that a court of law would accord little weight to the Commission's
interpretation and would instead apply a different standard. Because
this opinion may reflect others' views of the Commission's authority,
the Illinois Appellate Court's application of the correct standards in
this case not only served to uphold the law, but also affirmed the
Commission's authority to do so.
B. Preemption Analysis Omitted
One particularly conclusory point the court made was its affirma-
tion of the Commission's award of fees and costs. 138 The court af-
firmed the Commission's award of fees and costs based on the city's
authority both in the Fair Housing Ordinance and under the Illinois
Human Rights Act to pass a provision that is broader in scope than
the state law.' 39 Yet, while the language of the Fair Housing Ordi-
nance clearly gives the Commission broad authority to award civil
damages, 140 the language of the Illinois Human Rights Act is not as
clear. 141 The statute cited does not explicitly mention damages or
even remedies, and if the authority is implicit, the court does not ex-
plain how.142
The answer perhaps lies in the "broad home rule powers" created
by the Illinois Constitution. 143 The Illinois Constitution provides that
"home rule units," such as a municipality, "may exercise and perform
any function pertaining to their government and affairs, including reg-
ulation for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and wel-
fare. '144 Under this home rule power, unless preempted by another
provision of the Illinois Constitution, the City of Chicago has broad
137. In re Sullivan-Lackey, No. 99-H-89, 2001 WL 1042296, at *8 n.2 (Chi. Comm'n Human
Relations July 18, 2001) (quoting Respondent's brief).
138. See Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey, 815 N.E.2d 822, 829 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
139. See id.
140. Id. (quoting CHI. MUN. CODE § 2-120-510(1)).
141. The court derived the Commission's authority to award damages from the language of
the Illinois Human Rights Act, which permits (1) the creation of a local department for the
purpose of promoting the act, and (2) the provisions of an ordinance to protect "broader or
different categories of discrimination." Id. (citing 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-108(A) (West
2000)).
142. See id.
143. Page v. City of Chicago, 701 N.E.2d 218, 225 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (discussing the "home
rule powers").
144. Id. (citing Beverly Bank v. County of Cook, 510 N.E.2d 941 (Il. App. Ct. 1987)).
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power to legislate.145 The more expansive discrimination protection
provided by the City's Fair Housing Ordinance, including the damages
provision, could likely be upheld under Chicago's home rule power.146
But even more obviously absent from the court's opinion is an an-
swer to whether the City of Chicago has the authority to pass a law
broader in scope than the federal fair housing law. Perhaps the court
did not feel the need to explicitly address this question because it was
not argued by the plaintiffs. 147 Also, the preemption analysis has been
considered at length in previous Commission decisions, 48 so through
its extreme deference, the court may be assenting to the Commission's
conclusion on this point as well.149 Notice, however, that although the
court did not specifically identify any of its analysis as being preemp-
tion-related, its reference to the Commission's de minimis burden re-
quirement indicates that the issue did not escape consideration
completely. 50 Allowing landlords to have valid, nondiscriminatory
reasons for refusing to accept Section 8 vouchers reduces the
mandatory feel that the Program might otherwise have had following
this decision.151 The court was most likely saying that because of this
distinction, the ordinance avoids any plausible argument for preemp-
tion.152 Because the plaintiffs did not assert that Section 8 compliance
145. Id. The state legislature may preempt home rule authority in two ways, as provided in
the Illinois Constitution, article VII, sections 6(g) and 6(h). Id. "The legislature may preclude
the home rule authority in an area not regulated by the state through a three-fifths majority
vote," or the legislature may specifically preempt home rule in a particular piece of legislation.
Id. The Illinois Supreme Court has held these to be the only ways that the legislature can pre-
empt home rule authority. Id. (citing Kalodimos v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266 (I11.
1984)).
146. The Illinois Appellate Court has held that the City of Chicago has the authority to enact
a sexual harassment law applying to employers with less than fifteen employees, which is
broader than the state law's protection. See Page, 701 N.E.2d at 227.
147. The plaintiffs may have decided not to assert the preemption argument in the appellate
court because it was summarily rejected by the Commission. In re Sullivan-Lackey, No. 99-H-89,
2001 WL 1042296, at *4 (Chi. Comm'n Human Relations July 18, 2001).
148. See, e.g., In re Smith, Nos. 95-H-159, 98-H-44/63, 1999 WL 308207, at *7-8 (Chi. Comm'n
Human Relations Apr. 13, 1999); In re Hoskins, No. 01-H-101, 2003 WL 23529506, at *2 (Chi.
Comm'n Human Relations Apr. 16, 2003).
149. The Commission has held that the municipal ordinance is not preempted by the federal
statute. Sullivan-Lackey, 2001 WL 1042296, at *4.
150. See Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey, 815 N.E.2d 822, 827 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (noting that the
Commission specifically distinguishes between a landlord's objection to the financial burdens of
the Program and the tenant's source of income per se).
151. For a more in-depth consideration of the preemption arguments, see infra notes 166-182
and accompanying text.
152. The Seventh Circuit in Knapp asserted that the mandatory application of the Program
may be preempted. See Knapp v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272, 1282 (7th Cir. 1995).
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would impose a substantial financial burden, the court did not need to
address the factual question in this case. 153
C. Alternative Results
Although there are various alternative conclusions the court could
have reached, as set out in this section, most would have relied on
faulty reasoning or would have reduced the harshness of the result on
the plaintiff landlords. None of the precedent considered was binding
on the Illinois Appellate Court.'54 But the court chose, in support of
its own reasoning, to follow the weight of the relevant authority from
other jurisdictions and in turn reached the right result.155
1. Affirm the Circuit Court
The obvious alternative route the court could have taken would
have been to affirm the holding of the circuit court and to follow the
reasoning of Knapp. Although the Illinois Appellate Court reasoned
that the language of the two statutes was different, warranting differ-
ent interpretations, 56 in reality the language of both statutes could be
interpreted either way. In fact, in its definition of "lawful source of
income," the Wisconsin Open Housing Act specifically includes other
forms of public assistance such as food stamps and social security, des-
ignated as a "voucher representing monetary value."'1 57 The Seventh
Circuit distinguished Section 8 vouchers as "not hav[ing] a monetary
value independent of the voucher holder and the apartment sought,"
therefore making them more analogous to a subsidy rather than a
source of income.1 58 In doing so, however, the Seventh Circuit noted
that "[w]hile this form of assistance could arguably be included within
the Wisconsin Act, we decline to ascribe such an intent to the state
legislature because of the potential problems in doing so."'1 59 This
statement singularly indicates that the court was weighing policy con-
siderations much more heavily than the actual language of the legisla-
tion. In fact, other than considering the language of the statute, the
153. See Godinez, 815 N.E.2d at 828.
154. Id. at 827 ("not[ing] that the Seventh Circuit's construction of Wisconsin law is not bind-
ing .... ). New Jersey and Connecticut state court decisions are not binding on an Illinois state
court.
155. Id. at 828.
156. See id. at 827.
157. Knapp, 54 F.3d at 1282.
158. Id.
159. See id.
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Seventh Circuit did not look any further to determine the actual intent
of the state legislature. 160
Rather than making a decision based on potential problems in ap-
plication, the Illinois Appellate Court focused on the rules of legisla-
tive interpretation by first looking at the plain language of the
ordinance. If the language was ambiguous, only then would the court
consider the policy behind the legislation in order to determine the
legislative intent. 161 Similarly, the other courts that have deviated
from Knapp's conclusion have followed the rules of statutory interpre-
tation and have, therefore, come to a logical and reasonable result as
to the meaning of the statute under consideration. 162
2. Reverse the Factual Conclusion Regarding Discrimination
The Illinois Appellate Court could also have affirmed the reasoning
of the Commission, but reversed its factual conclusion that the plain-
tiffs discriminated against Ms. Sullivan-Lackey based on her source of
income. This would have made little sense, however, considering that
the standard of review for questions of fact is even higher than that for
questions of law.163 In fact, in cases of source-of-income discrimina-
tion, particularly involving Section 8 vouchers, the facts of the incident
are quite clear and the discrimination overt.164 This may be a result of
landlords not having any knowledge that their conduct is against the
law. But this is not a valid excuse, as demonstrated by the court's
160. See id.
161. See Alison C. v. Westcott; 798 N.E.2d 813, 816 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
162. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Sullivan Assocs., 739 A.2d 238, 248, 251
(Conn. 1999) (concluding that legislative inaction following administrative construction of a state
statute indicated validation of the interpretation); Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 725 A.2d
1104, 1112 (N.J. 1999) (interpreting the state statute according to "both the letter and the spirit
of" the statute).
163. For the court to overrule an administrative agency's decision on a question of fact, it
would have to be "against the manifest weight of the evidence." See Godinez v. Sullivan-
Lackey, 815 N.E.2d 822, 826 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
164. In this case, the facts were almost undisputed. The plaintiffs unsuccessfully claimed that
Ms. Sullivan Lackey "left with the [rental] application and never returned it." See In re Sullivan-
Lackey, No. 99-H-89, 2001 WL 1042296, at *2 (Chi. Comm'n Human Relations July 18, 2001).
This testimony was deemed "utterly incredible" by the Commission, considering that Sullivan-
Lackey's daughter found her mother's torn application on the floor in the building, en route to
the garbage. Id. See also In re Smith, Nos. 95-H-159, 98-H-44/63, 1999 WL 308207, at *1-2 (Chi.
Comm'n Human Relations Apr. 13, 1999) (observing that all three complainants had exper-
iences where the respondent directly said to them that he "did not accept Section 8"); In re
Hoskins, No. 01-H-101, 2003 WL 23529506, at *2 (Chi. Comm'n Human Relations Apr. 16 2003)
(alleging that complainant was told over the phone that respondent does not take Section 8 and
"want[s] working people in the place").
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prompt rejection of the plaintiffs' argument of insufficient notice, a
rejection based on past rulings of the Commission. 165
3. Potential Preemption Argument
Additionally, as alluded to in Knapp, and briefly addressed
above, 166 the court could have moved away from the weight of author-
ity and held that the federal Fair Housing Act preempts any state or
municipal law that is broader in scope. The Knapp court indicated
that it might have based this conclusion on voluntariness. 167 The Sev-
enth Circuit asserted that to interpret "source of income" in the stat-
ute to include voucher-holders would effectively "make a voluntary
federal program mandatory" on landlords, and possibly render it vul-
nerable to preemption. 168 This argument was echoed by the Second
Circuit in Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments.169 In its
holding, the court focused on the principle "that landlords have a stat-
utory right to avoid Section 8 participation .... ,,170 If a landlord can
be held liable for rejecting tenants on the basis of their status as
voucher-holders, the "statutory right" to opt out of the Program
disappears. 171
165. See Godinez, 815 N.E.2d at 828-29.
166. See supra notes 147-153 and accompanying text.
167. See Knapp v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272, 1282 (7th Cir. 1995).
168. Id.
169. 136 F.3d 293, 298 (2d Cir. 1998). The complaint in Salute was brought, in part, pursuant
to a statute that was repealed while the case was pending-"the take one, take all" provision of
the United States Housing Act. Id. at 296. This provision, repealed in 1996, provided that after
a landlord had voluntarily participated in the Section 8 Program, he or she could not refuse to
rent to Section 8 voucher-holders solely on the basis of their status as a voucher-holder. Id. at
297. The purpose of this legislation was to promote access to affordable housing for lower in-
come households by "prevent[ing] landlords from picking and choosing from the pool of Section
8 applicants ...." Id. But see Beck, supra note 39, at 167 (asserting that the statute in fact
created a disincentive for landlords to participate in the Program).
170. See Salute, 136 F.3d at 298.
171. Id. The owner of the apartment complex in Salute had accepted Section 8 vouchers from
existing tenants who began participating in the Program during their tenancy. Id. at 296. The
plaintiffs, prospective tenants, were subsequently denied apartments because they were voucher-
holders. Id. The Second Circuit held that the landlord did not violate the statute because there
was an exception to the "take one, take all" provision so that a landlord did not have to accept
Section 8 vouchers after agreeing to participate for existing tenants. Id. at 298. The court noted
that to hold otherwise would encourage eviction of tenants who had "experienced reversals of
fortune" and had enrolled in the Program, undermining the congressional intent of the provi-
sion. Id. at 295. But reading the provision in light of "the voluntary nature of the Section 8
program," the court upheld the exception drawn by the district court. Salute, 136 F.3d at 298.
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This argument sounds persuasive, but does not fit within any of the
three ways that a federal statute preempts state or municipal law.
172
State or local law can be preempted by federal law when: (1) Congress
has expressly stated that the federal law preempts state law;1 73 (2) the
federal legislation is so comprehensive that it leaves "no room" for
state law in that area;174 or (3) state law actually conflicts with federal
law so that compliance with both is impossible or state law "stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress. '175 The courts that have directly consid-
ered the issue of preemption in the context of source-of-income dis-
crimination including protection for voucher-holders, have
unanimously held that applicable federal legislation does not preempt
state or local law.176 No language in the federal statute expressly
preempts state legislation, the federal statute is not so comprehensive
as to preempt the field, and it is not impossible to comply with both
laws. 177 Although the federal law is voluntary in nature, that volunta-
riness is "not at the heart of the federal scheme."'1 78 Therefore, a state
statute mandating landlord participation does not conflict or frustrate
Congress's objective to aid lower income families in finding an afford-
able, decent place to live.179 Furthermore, "state laws imposing
stricter requirements than federal law are not necessarily
preempted. '"180
Although it did not address any of these arguments directly, the
court in Godinez did not view its decision as mandating landlord par-
ticipation in the Housing Choice Voucher Program, but rather as de-
termining that invidious discrimination was not an acceptable reason
for not participating. 181 Because the Illinois Appellate Court left
open the possibility that a landlord could successfully argue that com-
172. One of the most comprehensive and thorough preemption analyses of this issue appears
in In re Smith, Nos. 95-H-159, 98-H-44/63, 1999 WL 308207, at *7-15 (Chi. Comm'n Human
Relations Apr. 13, 1999).
173. See Attorney Gen. v. Brown, 511 N.E.2d 1103, 1105 (Mass. 1987).
174. See id. (commonly known as "field preemption").
175. See id. at 1106 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
176. Id. at 1107; see also Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Sullivan Assocs., 739
A.2d 238, 245, 251 (Conn. 1999); Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 725 A.2d 1104, 1114 (N.J.
1999).
177. See, e.g., Sullivan Associates, 739 A.2d at 246; Brown, 511 N.E.2d at 1105-06; Franklin
Tower One, 725 A.2d at 1113.
178. See Franklin Tower One, 725 A.2d at 1113.
179. See Brown, 511 N.E.2d at 1106.
180. See Franklin Tower One, 725 A.2d at 1112.
181. Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey, 815 N.E.2d 822, 828 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (stating that the
determination of a violation of the ordinance turns on the reason for refusal of the individual
tenant).
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plying with the Program creates a substantial financial burden, its
holding does not make the Program mandatory. 82
4. Option of Awarding Fees and Costs
The court also could have reversed the circuit court's holding, but
instead of reinstating the Commission's holding, the court could have
deviated from it by not awarding fees and costs. Although this possi-
bility weighs more heavily on the impact of the holding, as addressed
below, 183 it also bears on the preemption analysis. One could argue
that awarding fees and costs in this case further causes a voluntary
program to become mandatory.
The Second Circuit in Salute reasoned that even if the plaintiffs had
had a private right of action under the Fair Housing Act, the award of
damages would be even more unlikely.184 The court said that to do so
"might severely discourage landlord participation in the Section 8 pro-
gram by creating an open-ended liability for landlord participants.' 85
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Knapp held that even though a jury
determined that the landlord did discriminate against the plaintiff in
violation of the statute, the district court was correct in limiting dam-
ages to equitable and contractual remedies, thus reducing the jury ver-
dict of $95,000 to $1.186 The court based its affirmance on the
consideration that allowing unlimited compensatory damages "would
deter owners from participating in the section 8 program" and work
against Congress's goal to make housing more available to tenants
participating in the Program.187
Unlike the above cases, the result in Godinez will not necessarily
deter landlord participation in the traditional sense because landlords
are not given a choice.188 In this case, although it would not be an
issue of discouraging landlord participation, one could argue that
awarding fees and costs in this case further strengthens the notion that
a voluntary program is indeed mandatory. If a landlord feels open to
unlimited liability, he or she may feel obligated to accept every
182. See id. at 827.
183. See infra notes 216-221 and accompanying text.
184. Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 1998).
185. Id.
186. Knapp v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272, 1275 (7th Cir. 1995).
187. Id. at 1278.
188. The Illinois Appellate Court did not explicitly say so, but the Commission has held that
"the City of Chicago has mandated that its landlords participate in the Section 8 program." See
In re Smith, Nos. 95-H-159, 98-H-44/63, 1999 WL 308207, at *7 (Chi. Comm'n Human Relations
Apr. 13, 1999).
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voucher-holder that seeks to rent an apartment. 189 Although it is still
undetermined whether mandatory landlord participation would be
preempted or otherwise unconstitutional, this is not the effect of the
holding in Godinez.190 Not only can the landlord object to the Pro-
gram on the grounds of substantial financial burden, but he or she can
reject a voucher-holder for any reason that a non-voucher-holding po-
tential tenant would be rejected. 191
In sum, the Illinois Appellate Court reached the right result by de-
ferring to the Commission, adopting the Commission's interpretation
of the law and its preemption analysis. While the court's holding is
based on strong legal reasoning, the weaknesses inherent in these al-
ternative arguments serve as additional support for the court's hold-
ing. By including the possibility for a de minimis burden exception,
the court avoided having to determine whether making the Program
mandatory would result in preemption.
V. IMPACT
The court reached the correct result, not only in terms of the law,
but also for the future of Housing Choice Voucher holders. The law in
Chicago, as affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court, provides a work-
able solution that can be locally enforced and provides voucher-hold-
ers with a legal remedy. 192 Prohibiting discrimination against
voucher-holders based on their source of income will increase the
availability of units for voucher-holders, especially in low poverty
neighborhoods. 193 This increased availability will create a better out-
look for the future of the CHA's Plan for Transformation, and will
give former public housing residents more possibilities in reloca-
tion.194 But the newly confirmed law is not the ultimate solution to
housing discrimination. Landlords remain resistant to the Program
and may attempt to use the "de minimis burden" exception to bypass
189. While this might have been the court's intent, it is not the holding of the case.
190. Compare Knapp, 54 F.3d at 1282, with Smith, 1999 WL 308207, at *16-19 (holding that
the ordinance is not preempted, does not violate landlord's procedural due process, does not
improperly infringe the landlord's freedom of contract, and does not violate the takings clause of
the Fifth Amendment), and Attorney Gen. v. Brown, 511 N.E.2d 1103, 1106 (Mass. 1987) (hold-
ing that just because Congress provided for voluntary participation, the states are not precluded
"from mandating participation, absent some valid nondiscriminatory reason for not
participating").
191. Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 725 A.2d 1104, 1114 (N.J. 1999) (noting that a land-
lord always has the right to review a tenant's references, rental history, and other information, as
long as he or she treats voucher-holders the same as any other prospective tenant).
192. See infra notes 199-210 and accompanying text.
193. See infra notes 211-226 and accompanying text.
194. See infra notes 227-237 and accompanying text.
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the law.' 95 The law applies only to the City of Chicago and, therefore,
cannot be enforced against landlords throughout the state. 196 Al-
though mandating landlord participation in the Housing Choice
Voucher Program would likely be permissible, it is not preferable.1 97
Until society can find a way to change the discriminatory attitudes
perpetuating housing patterns segregated by class and race, no law
will truly fulfill the goals of the Housing Choice Voucher Program. 198
A. What Will Godinez Remedy?
The Illinois Appellate Court's holding in Godinez served to reaf-
firm the City of Chicago's existing law against source-of-income dis-
crimination, including protection for voucher-holders. This law,
although not an ideal remedy, is a workable solution to the problems
that currently plague the utility of the Housing Choice Voucher Pro-
gram. The law can be enforced locally, and discrimination against
voucher-holders can no longer be used as a proxy for racial discrimi-
nation. It provides legal recourse, including possible damage awards,
for voucher-holders that have been discriminated against on the basis
of their source of income. Overall it will increase the total number of
units available to voucher-holders, which is especially important for
the future of the CHA's Plan for Transformation.
1. A Workable Solution
Discrimination against Housing Choice Voucher holders has greatly
diminished the Program's effectiveness and its ability to achieve its
goals.199 Some have even argued that discrimination against voucher-
holders has served as a proxy for racial discrimination.200 If the law
permits discrimination on the basis of one's status as a voucher-
holder, a landlord can use that status as an excuse for discrimination
on the basis of race, gender, or other family characteristics. 20 1
Legal scholars have proffered various solutions to the problem.
Paula Beck has proposed that the Fair Housing Act be amended to
include source of income as a protected class.202 More specifically,
she proposed that "status with regard to rental assistance" be pro-
195. See infra notes 238-249 and accompanying text.
196. See infra notes 250-254 and accompanying text.
197. See infra notes 255-271 and accompanying text.
198. See infra notes 272-277 and accompanying text.
199. See Beck, supra note 39, at 159.
200. Malaspina, supra note 1, at 313.
201. Id.; see also Beck, supra note 39.
202. Beck, supra note 39, at 171.
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tected from discrimination under the statute.20 3 On a smaller scale,
one student article has proposed a course of action that some plaintiffs
have already attempted: finding protection within existing law by
molding source-of-income discrimination into another category of dis-
crimination. 204 This student also proposed HUD-promulgated regula-
tions that would prohibit source-of-income discrimination, namely
discrimination against voucher-holders based solely on their status as
Housing Choice Voucher Program participants.20 5 These propositions
are excellent for exactly that, propositions. The solutions proposed by
these authors are idealistic, but not probable, especially considering
the more conservative direction of many of our nation's policies. 20 6
If finding a solution that would provide maximum impact and im-
mediate results is the ultimate goal, then the holding in Godinez is not
the answer. It is not universal, it is not sweeping, and change will take
a long time. But where changes at the federal level are unlikely, the
most realistic way to attack this problem is at the state and local
levels. 20 7 Beck proposed her amendment eight years ago and no
change has been made.20 8 This, along with the holding of the Seventh
Circuit in Knapp, provides evidence of the tentativeness, if not resis-
tance, of the federal legislature and judiciary to include source of in-
come and especially Section 8 voucher-holders as a protected class.
Various state courts have held that the federal Fair Housing Act
does not preempt state or local regulations that may be more restric-
tive or even make the Housing Choice Voucher Program mandatory
with its jurisdiction. 20 9 Congress has not made any amendments in
response, possibly indicating acceptance of this interpretation (or at
203. Id.
204. Kim Johnson-Spratt, Note, Housing Discrimination and Source of Income: A Tenant's
Losing Battle, 32 IND. L. REV. 457, 473-75 (1999).
205. Id. at 476-79.
206. Jonathan Weisman, Bush Plans Sharp Cuts in HUD Community Efforts, WASH. POST,
Jan. 14, 2005, at Al. One proposal in the 2006 Federal Budget suggested that the Department of
Housing and Urban Development may be eliminated altogether through its consolidation with
the more business-friendly Commerce Department. Id.
207. Cf Beck, supra note 39, at 170. Beck noted that the "handful of state cases [addressing
the issue of source-of-income discrimination in housing] produced widely disparate results, sug-
gesting that" federal legislation would be more effective. Id.
208. Since Beck's article proposed amending the Fair Housing Act to include protection for
source-of-income discrimination in 1996, there have in fact been bills proposing the expansion of
the Fair Housing Act but only to the extent of adding protection against discrimination based on
sexual orientation. See, e.g., H.R. 214, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 217, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.
311, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 365, 105th Cong. (1997).
209. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Sullivan Assocs., 739 A.2d 238, 245
(Conn. 1999); Attorney Gen. v. Brown, 511 N.E.2d 1103, 1107 (Mass. 1987); Franklin Tower
One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 725 A.2d 1104, 1114 (N.J. 1999).
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least not complete opposition).210 Perhaps by using administration at
the state level as a test, national policy will follow suit.
2. The Chance for Change
Although this solution may seem disjointed, it will offer much
needed change in large cities where the need for affordable housing is
reaching crisis levels. The widespread refusal of landlords to rent to
voucher-holders may be the "most serious obstacle" to the utility of
the Section 8 Program. 211 The result of this pervasive nonparticipa-
tion has been "Section 8 submarkets," specific areas where landlords
typically accept vouchers, and voucher-holders have, in response, lim-
ited their search for available units to those areas. 212 At the very
least, the law in Chicago provides a better path of recourse for
voucher-holders who are victims of discrimination. 213 At a grassroots
level, local fair housing advocacy groups can conduct telephone re-
search to enforce the provision, just as they currently do with race and
gender discrimination. 214
Additionally, the Illinois Appellate Court's holding, allowing for
the award of fees and costs, has the important function of making
landlords responsible for knowing and abiding by the current law.215
Just the mere possibility of incurring liability, including damages and
attorney's fees, will deter some landlords from discriminating against
Housing Choice Voucher holders. For others, it will only deter overt
discrimination, and they will find other reasons for rejecting voucher-
holders as tenants.
Although not addressed in Godinez, the Illinois Appellate Court
has even authorized the Commission to award punitive damages. 216
The provision of the Chicago Municipal Code that allows the Com-
mission to award damages, fees, and costs was used in Page v. City of
Chicago to award punitive damages in the context of a claim for sex-
ual harassment. 217 The Illinois Appellate Court in Page considered
not only the language of the provision, but the fact that sexual harass-
210. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
211. Malaspina, supra note 1, at 311.
212. Id. (quoting STEPHEN D. KENNEDY & MERYL FINKEL, SECTION 8 RENTAL VOUCHER
AND RENTAL CERTIFICATE UTILIZATION STUDY: FINAL REPORT IV, at 72 (1994)).
213. Id. at 316.
214. Id.
215. Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey, 815 N.E.2d 822, 829 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
216. Page v. City of Chicago, 701 N.E.2d 218, 227 (Il. App. Ct. 1998).
217. See CHI. MUN. CODE § 2-120-510(l) (2003).
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ment was an area where punitive damages "would be highly appropri-
ate and necessary. '218
Discrimination in housing, especially in instances where it is overt,
would also be an appropriate area for awarding punitive damages. In
fact, punitive damages may be a necessary measure for the Commis-
sion to take in order to hold landlords responsible for their actions
and reduce the instances of source-of-income discrimination among
them. The Commission touched on this point in its hearing of the
Godinez case.2 19 In its opinion, the Commission stated that it did not
award punitive damages in this particular case because of the land-
lords' good-faith belief that they did not have to participate in the
Section 8 Program.220 But, the Commission explicitly left open the
possibility of awarding punitive damages in the future, implying that
as time goes on, a good faith belief such as that held by the Godinezes
will be less plausible. 221
Aside from providing legal recourse, the holding in Godinez will
make more units of housing available to voucher-holders. For the
most part, voucher-holders have been limited to apartments that are
at or below the HUD-established FMR for their region.222 In April
1994, HUD encouraged PHAs to establish "exception rent" areas in
order to expand the areas available for voucher-holders, namely "ar-
eas outside of high-poverty census tracts. z22 3 Because rent charged
for units in these areas typically exceeds the FMR established by
HUD, the exception purports to make more units available in "oppor-
tunity areas. a22 4
The CHA, in an attempt to further the objective of transforming
public housing and creating mixed-income communities, has desig-
nated certain Chicago neighborhoods as optimal for relocation and
has increased the available rental subsidy in order to offset the higher
rent in these areas.225 These "exception rent areas" include the Lin-
218. Page, 701 N.E.2d at 228. The Ordinance calls for "such relief as may be appropriate."
CHI. MUN. CODE § 2-120-510().
219. In re Sullivan-Lackey, No. 99-H-89, 2001 WL 1042296, at *7 (Chi. Comm'n Human Rela-
tions July 18, 2001).
220. Id.
221. Id. at *8. The Commission gives the example that a good faith belief in the lawfulness of
racial discrimination would not necessarily bar punitive damages. Id.
222. Tegeler et al., supra note 64, at 479.
223. Id. at 479 (quoting Apr. 6, 1994 HUD Interim Notice) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
224. See FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, supra note 63, at 2 n.4. The Chicago Area Fair Housing
Alliance defines an opportunity area (in Chicago) as an area that is "less than 13% African
American and less than 10% poverty." Id.
225. See LCBH, supra note 6, at 5.
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coin Park and Near North neighborhoods, where the CHA offers to
pay up to twenty percent more than the FMR for voucher-holders
who find units in these areas.226 Although this effectively increases
the value of the voucher for the individual and seems to greatly ex-
pand the number of units available, if landlords are able to discrimi-
nate against voucher-holders based on their source of income, the
additional opportunity is only theoretical. The holding in Godinez,
affirming that source-of-income discrimination is against the law, will
serve to make housing in these areas truly available for voucher-hold-
ers seeking an apartment.
3. The Future of the CHA's Plan for Transformation
The current trend toward reliance on voucher and other mobility-
based programs to house the nation's poor purports to be the answer
to the current isolation and segregation of minorities and the lower
economic class. But as cities across the country attempt to quickly
demolish existing high rises and transform their housing policies ac-
cordingly, the people and families that are affected have largely been
forgotten. 227 In Chicago, the CHA has used Section 8 vouchers to
relocate families whose existing public housing units have been or will
be demolished according to its Plan for Transformation.2 28 This is an
ideal solution for the housing authority because the voucher program
is easier to administer than the construction of new housing, and also
because the CHA currently has no obligation to make sure the
voucher-holders move to integrated areas.2 29 As a result, it seems that
"[t]he CHA's sole concern is that families receiving Section 8 vouch-
ers find housing somewhere-anywhere-regardless of whether the
housing is in an integrated neighborhood or not. '230
226. Id.
227. Crump, supra note 42, at 186. In fact, a recent report reflects that the Chicago Housing
Authority has lost track of many of the former tenants of demolished high rise apartments. See
Antonio Olivo, Report Hits CHA for Losing Residents, CHI. TRIB., July 22, 2005, § 2, at 3.
228. Kate N. Grossman, 14 Cabrini High-Rises to Close, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 10, 2005, § 2, at
8.
229. Seliga, supra note 41, at 1081. In Gautreaux, the Northern District Court of Illinois
found that the CHA's site selection for public housing sites and its procedures for unit allocation
to tenants had violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by maintain-
ing existing patterns of racial segregation in Chicago. Id. at 1056. The court-ordered remedy
mandated a "scattered-site" system for the construction of new public housing buildings, with
equal numbers of units in both predominantly African American and predominantly white areas.
Id. at 1050. Litigation surrounding the implementation of this mandate is ongoing, with one of
the most recent decisions holding that the order does not apply to the Section 8 Program. Id. at
1081.
230. Id. at 1082. Although the original mandate in Gautreaux may not apply to the Section 8
Program, a new lawsuit was filed similarly challenging the Chicago Housing Authority's reloca-
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The rapid relocation of families, with neither the time nor resources
to explore their options for new housing, has resulted in relocation to
privately owned housing in low-income, mostly black neighbor-
hoods.231 In other words, the result of the CHA's current approach to
the implementation of vouchers as a part of its Plan for Transforma-
tion is simply moving low-income residents into equally bad neighbor-
hoods, or sometimes neighborhoods even worse than those they are
leaving. 232 One author commented: "Regrettably, it may take another
round of ghetto explosions before policy-makers admit that there are
no quick fixes to the legacy of systematic discrimination that has
shaped the American city. '233
Much of the litigation and scholarly writing surrounding the imple-
mentation of the City's plan was focused on racial discrimination. 234
But, as one author pointed out, race alone cannot be the only cause of
segregated housing patterns.235 Underlying racial prejudice is a
"heavy overtone of class-based discrimination. '236 If class-based dis-
crimination is permitted under the law, the racial discrimination that
often accompanies it becomes permissible as well. 237 The holding in
Godinez will help reverse this cycle and allow voucher-holders to
move to neighborhoods that are truly of their choosing. As landlords
begin to understand that they can no longer say, "I don't accept Sec-
tion 8," and as more local testers discover source-of-income discrimi-
nation, more units will be available to voucher-holders. This increase
in available units should improve the outlook for the CHA's Plan for
Transformation, and possibly even alleviate the need for further litiga-
tion surrounding its implementation.
tion practices, alleging an ongoing practice of racial steering and perpetuation of segregation.
See Wallace v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 298 F. Supp. 2d 710, 716 (N.D. Ill. 2003), amended in part by
321 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
231. Crump, supra note 42, at 186.
232. Id.; Fischer, supra note 4, at 13.
233. Crump, supra note 42, at 186.
234. See, e.g., Wallace, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 710; Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 66
C1459, 2004 WL 1427107, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 2004); Alexander Polikoff, "Racial Inequality
and the Black Ghetto," POVERTY & RACE (Poverty & Race Res. Action Council, Washington
D.C.), Nov.-Dec. 2004.
235. Lisa M. Krzewinski, Section 8's Failure to Integrate: The Interaction of Class-Based and
Racial Discrimination, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 315, 316-17 (2001) (reviewing STEPHEN
GRAwr MEYER, As LoNG As THEY DON'T MOVE NEXT DOOR (2000)).
236. Id. at 317.
237. Id. at 325.
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B. Obstacles Remain
Although the holding in Godinez is a huge step forward for the fu-
ture of public housing policy in Chicago, some obstacles could prove
to be major setbacks if not handled properly. The Illinois Appellate
Court left open the possibility that a landlord could circumvent the
law by claiming that participation in the voucher program will cause
him or her a substantial financial burden.2 38 Considering their contin-
ued reluctance to participate in the Program and to accept voucher-
holders as tenants, landlords are likely to use this exception to its full
extent if allowed by the Commission and by the courts. Also, consid-
ering the limited scope of the Chicago ordinance, it will have a limited
impact on the choices of voucher-holders if the city's surrounding
communities and other communities throughout the state of Illinois
do not adopt similar provisions. Furthermore, the policy of mandating
the Program for landlords, if not accompanied by incentives, may
have adverse consequences for landlord participation and for the Pro-
gram as a whole.
1. One Major Loophole: The "De Minimis" Burden
The holding in Godinez will foreclose many of the reasons that
landlords have proffered for why they do not accept vouchers-holders
as tenants (or why they do not like to accept them). Although a num-
ber of these reasons were illogical to begin with, they are now clearly
illegal. Take, for example, a landlord who is concerned about nonpay-
ing tenants. Because the payment assistance contract signed by both
the landlord and the PHA guarantees payment, a landlord is in fact
better off accepting a voucher-holder than he or she would be ac-
cepting many other tenants. This type of excuse not only reflects a
landlord's lack of knowledge and understanding of the Program, but
also reflects a hostile attitude toward accepting voucher-holders as
tenants.
After Godinez, a landlord can only offer two rationales for rejecting
a Housing Choice Voucher holder: (1) compliance with the Program
would result in a substantial financial burden, or (2) a tenant was re-
jected for a nondiscriminatory reason that could apply to any prospec-
tive tenant.2 39 At least one court has accepted the argument that
nondiscriminatory, "objectionable features of the Section 8 lease" re-
238. Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey, 815 N.E.2d 822, 828 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
239. See id.
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suited in the refusal to rent the unit.240 In most states, landlords can
still refuse a tenant on the grounds that the requirements under the
Section 8 Program serve an unduly onerous financial burden-an ob-
jection to the burdens of Section 8 compliance, rather than an objec-
tion to Section 8 tenants (a difficult distinction). 241 The way that
future courts apply the de minimis burden standard will be important
in determining the real impact of Godinez. The less substantial the
financial burden needs to be for the landlord to be permitted to reject
voucher-holders, the more it will be used as an excuse by landlords.
In fact, this exception has the potential, if applied incorrectly, to swal-
low the protection of the ordinance.
The FMR for a given locality is determined annually by HUD and is
used by the PHAs to determine the payment standard amount.242 The
proposed FMRs for 2005, published on August 6, 2004, were calcu-
lated in a new way using data from the 2000 Census and the new Of-
fice of Management and Budget (OMB) metropolitan area
definitions.243 The net result of this calculation was to lower FMRs in
certain areas, which would have effectively decreased the value of in-
dividual vouchers in the Housing Choice Voucher Program.244 In
part, as a result of the public outcry that ensued, HUD recalculated
the FMR using the old metropolitan area definitions used for the 2004
calculations. 245 This accounted for any change in the FMR as a result
of geography, 246 but using the most recent census data still resulted in
a decrease in some areas.247 Although the new rents do not change
the number of vouchers available or reduce the Program's budget, it
reduces the value of a-voucher to an individual or family.248 A land-
lord may attempt to use these new figures to claim that participation
in the Housing Choice Voucher Program causes an unreasonable bur-
den. If this argument is offered by a landlord, it should fail because
240. Beck, supra note 39, at 167-68 (citing Peyton v. Reynolds Assocs., 955 F.2d 247, 252 (4th
Cir. 1992)).
241. Malaspina, supra note 1, at 316.
242. Fair Market Rents for the Housing Choice Voucher Program and Moderate Rehabilita-
tion Single Room Occupancy Program Fiscal Year 2005, 69 Fed. Reg. 59,004 (Oct. 1, 2004) [here-
inafter Fair Market Rents].
243. Id.
244. Grady & Olivo, supra note 5.
245. Fair Market Rents, 69 Fed. Reg. at 59,004. The final FMRs, effective October 1, 2004,
reflect this calculation. Id.
246. Id. at 59,008-09. Where possible, the 2000 Census data was updated by random, digit-
dialing survey data.
247. Id.
248. Grady & Olivo, supra note 5.
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the HUD calculations are based on the most recent available data and
adjusted annually.249
2. Limited Application
Unfortunately, the Illinois Appellate Court did not have a way of
expanding its decision to impact a larger area and was forced to limit
its scope to the City of Chicago, to the exclusion of Cook County and
the surrounding areas.250 The Chicago Fair Housing Ordinance is
broader than the Illinois Human Rights Act, offering protection
against discrimination for a greater number of people. Under the Illi-
nois Human Rights Act, "[u]nlawful discrimination" means "discrimi-
nation against a person because of his or her race, color, religion,
national origin, ancestry, age, sex, marital status, handicap, military
status, or unfavorable discharge from military service .... 251 Be-
cause source of income is not included in this definition, in order for it
to be a protected class, an individual municipality would have to pass
its own law prohibiting discrimination based on source of income.252
This will limit the impact of the Godinez holding in the Chicago
metropolitan area and beyond. AS voucher-holders attempt to use
their subsidies outside of the city limits, other mobility issues aside,
they will almost certainly find that many landlords simply do not ac-
cept Section 8 tenants.253 Unfortunately, where source of income is
249. Beck, supra note 39, at 164. For the 2006 Final Fair Market Rent calculations, effective
October 1, 2005, see Final Fair Market Rents for the Housing Choice Voucher Program and
Moderate Rehabilitation Single Room Occupancy Program Fiscal Year 2006, 70 Fed. Reg. 57,654
(Oct. 3, 2005). The 2006 FMRs were calculated using the revised OMB county-based statistical
area definitions with some modifications to limit the number of large changes. Id.
250. The Chicago Fair Housing Ordinance applies only to landlords living within the City of
Chicago. Each county and the State of Illinois has its own provisions for fair housing that are
not as broad. See, e.g., Cook County, Ill., Cook County Human Rights Ordinance, 93-0-13
(2002), available at http://cookcountygov.com/PDFTransfers/cc-human.rightsord.pdf; Illinois
Human Rights Act, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-103(Q) (2002).
251. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-103(Q).
252. Although this is the current state of the law, efforts to amend the Illinois Human Rights
Act to include protection against "source of income" discrimination are ongoing. The most re-
cent effort is a bill introduced to the Illinois State Senate on February 2, 2005. This bill adds
source of income as a protected category, defining the term as follows: (0-5) "Source of In-
come. Source of income means any lawful income, subsidy, or benefit with which an individual
supports himself or herself and his or her dependents, including, but not limited to, child sup-
port, maintenance, and any federal, State, or local public assistance, medical assistance, or rental
assistance program." S.B. 0167, 94th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2005).
253. Tegeler et al., supra note 64, at 453. The authors created a fictional person whose experi-
ence they felt represented that of many individuals trying to obtain or use a Section 8 voucher.
Id. at 451 n.1. This article provides an excellent discussion of the mobility issues faced by
voucher-holders when attempting to use their vouchers in a city's surrounding suburbs. Id. at
461-86.
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not a protected class, this response is permissible under the law of the
state and the individual has little recourse against the landlord.
Under both federal law and the current law of most states, the only
way to expand the legal protection for voucher-holders would be to
encourage other municipalities in Illinois and across the country to
pass similar legislation. The City of Chicago Fair Housing Ordinance
and the Chicago Commission on Human Relation's resulting interpre-
tation should serve as an example for the rest of the country. The
Commission's broad interpretation and strict enforcement of the stat-
ute truly serve to further the goal that all residents are able to seek
housing free from discrimination. Further, the Commission's action is
consistent with the purported goal of the Housing Choice Voucher
legislation: "aiding low-income families in obtaining a decent place to
live and promoting economically mixed housing .... "254
3. Mandating, Rather Than Encouraging, Landlord Participation
Although the Illinois Appellate Court in Godinez did not intend its
holding to mandate landlord participation in the Housing Choice
Voucher Program, the Commission does not seem at all uncomforta-
ble with this interpretation. 255  The Commission rejected the
Godinezes' argument that to include Section 8 vouchers within the
definition of "source of income" would be to involuntarily subject
every landlord to the requirements of the Program.256 The Commis-
sion's opinion used stronger language than the Illinois Appellate
Court, addressing the issue head-on:
[A] landlord who is approached by a prospective Section 8 tenant
has a duty to seek approval to accept Section 8 for the unit in ques-
tion .... The Commission now holds that a landlord must make at
least a good faith effort to comply with the requirements .... The
mere possibility that a property may not be approved cannot excuse
a refusal to seek the necessary approval in the first place.257
In addition to the Commission, courts have held that federal law
does not preclude states from mandating landlord participation in the
Housing Choice Voucher Program.258 These arguments arise in judi-
cial decisions in the context of preemption analysis, but there is a pol-
icy consideration at stake as well. Regardless of the law, the reality is
254. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (2000).
255. In re Sullivan-Lackey, No. 99-H-89, 2001 WL 1042296, at *4 (Chi. Comm'n Human Rela-
tions July 18, 2001).
256. Id. at *3.
257. Id. at *4.
258. See supra notes 176-180 and accompanying text.
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that landlords are resistant to participate in the Housing Choice
Voucher Program.2 59
In 1987, in an effort to encourage landlord participation, Congress
passed the "take one, take all" provision, stating that once a landlord
had accepted a Section 8 tenant, he or she could no longer refuse to
accept Section 8 tenants based solely on their status as subsidy recipi-
ents.260 In practice, this statute had the opposite of its intended effect
by creating a disincentive for landlords to participate at all in the Pro-
gram because subsequent tenants seeking to rent automatically had a
discrimination claim.261 Congress repealed the statute in 1996, largely
because of the unforeseen adverse consequences.2 62 The short life of
this statute serves to illustrate the difficulty in resolving the tension
between measures that encourage landlord participation and mea-
sures that are more coercive.
Landlords have proffered countless reasons as to why they are op-
posed to participating in the Housing Choice Voucher Program.
Some are unreasonable assumptions based on stereotypes, but others
do have merit.2 63 Landlords are mainly concerned about two aspects
of the Program: the ability to evict an unfavorable tenant, and the
financial burden of maintaining the unit in compliance with the speci-
fications of the Program.264 There are specific procedural require-
ments for evicting a tenant under the Program that must be complied
with, otherwise the eviction is invalid.265 Additionally, HUD has es-
tablished Housing Quality Standards (Standards) for the units that are
occupied by voucher-holders. 266 The Standards are usually no more
stringent than the local building code, but compliance with the Stan-
dards is more closely watched by the local PHA than the building
codes are by local inspectors. 267 Units are inspected initially, and then
annually upon renewal of the lease.268 If a violation is found and the
owner does not promptly make repairs, the PHA will terminate the
contract and cease making payments.2 69
259. Malaspina, supra note 1, at 311-12.
260. This provision was passed as a part of the Housing and Community Development Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 147, 101 Stat. 1815 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)).
261. Beck, supra note 39, at 167.
262. Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 725 A.2d 1104, 1109 (N.J. 1999) (citing Beck, supra
note 39, at 157).
263. Beck, supra note 39, at 163-66.
264. Malaspina, supra note 1, at 312-13; see also Beck, supra note 39, at 165-66.
265. Malaspina, supra note 1, at 313.
266. Beck, supra note 39, at 175.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
2006] 1305
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Mandating the Housing Choice Voucher Program may have future
adverse consequences. The obligation to seek Section 8 compliance
may drive some landlords out of the market if they do not wish to
participate. Others may raise their rent so that it is higher than the
FMR, and their units would therefore be less likely to attract voucher-
holders as potential tenants. In order to avoid these results, HUD and
the local PHAs need to work together to pass incentives to encourage
landlords to participate in the Program. First, steps could be taken to
educate landlords about the existing benefits of participation. Many
landlords might feel differently about the Program if they knew about
some of the protections it offers them.270 Second, if owners were per-
mitted to treat voucher-holders in the same way that they treat other
tenants, using the same lease provisions and governed by the same
state and local rules for eviction, more landlords would be likely to
participate. 271
Legislated change, even when backed by the judiciary, does not
necessarily have the effect of actual change. In fact, "the most salient
option in promoting racially-integrated neighborhoods is to reverse
the discriminatory attitudes that furnish the motivation in the first in-
stance, whether the motivation be class-based or race-based or one as
a pretext for the other. ' '272 One author has noted that despite it being
"130 years since Congress prohibited racial discrimination in hous-
ing," pervasive racial discrimination and segregation exist within the
public housing system, particularly in the Section 8 Program. 273 She
argued that this was largely due to HUD's failure to take affirmative
action to insure that its programs were administered in compliance
with the law, even when ordered by a court pursuant to litigation.274
Of course the degree of effectiveness of any antidiscriminatory legisla-
tion such as this depends on the degree to which the discrimination
can be detected and if found, an appropriate consequence applied.
An effective detection and meaningful consequence will likely result
in deterrence and ultimately a decrease in the prevalence of discrimi-
nation. HUD could aid in this effort by creating a fair housing en-
270. See id. at 163-64. For instance, because the landlord signs a contract with the PHA, the
landlord is guaranteed payment of rent for the year. A landlord can evict a tenant for serious
violations of the lease, violations of the law, and for good cause. Id.
271. Malaspina, supra note 1, at 314.
272. Krzewinski, supra note 235, at 328.
273. Florence Wagman Roisman, Long Overdue: Desegregation Litigation and Next Steps to
End Discrimination and Segregation in the Public Housing and Section 8 Existing Housing Pro-
grams, 4 CITYSCAPE: J. POL'Y DEV. & RES. 171, 171 (1999).
274. Id. at 174.
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forcement organization in each city and metropolitan area where
there is a demonstrated need.2 75
Some might argue that by mandating landlord participation in the
Program, changes in the prevalence of source-of-income discrimina-
tion may mimic the history of race discrimination in housing-follow-
ing the Fair Housing Act, overt discrimination slowly disappeared, but
it was replaced by a more covert discrimination. 276 This kind of dis-
crimination is less easily detectable, and more importantly, less easily
proven in a court of law. 277 If the municipality were to pass provisions
that were designed to promote rather than mandate landlord partici-
pation, discrimination against voucher-holders would be less likely to
go unchecked.
The holding in Godinez has the potential to greatly influence the
future of the Housing Choice Voucher Program. It reinforces the ex-
isting law in Chicago, puts landlords on notice, and provides legal re-
course for voucher-holders. This "chance for change" will at least
begin to address some of the obstacles faced by voucher-holders in
attempting to use their subsidies prior to their expiration. The law
should make more units available for voucher-holders, particularly in
opportunity areas, which is particularly important for those relocating
as a part of the CHA's Plan for Transformation. Of course the law is
not an all-encompassing solution. The de minimis burden exception
allowed by the court, if applied improperly, has the potential to elimi-
nate the protection of the ordinance. The applicability of the ordi-
nance is limited to the City of Chicago, but will serve as a model for
other states and municipalities. Finally, a program that effectively
mandates landlord participation may have an adverse effect on the
rental market. Until the discriminatory attitudes that sustain this
class-based discrimination are eliminated, legislated change only goes
so far.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Illinois Appellate Court's holding in Godinez v. Sullivan-
Lackey will help provide a meaningful choice for Housing Choice
Voucher holders. With the increased reliance of national and local
housing policy on subsidized vouchers, the ability of individuals to use
275. Id. at 175. Of course, considering HUD's 2006 eleven percent Discretionary Budget de-
crease and the present administration's focus on homeownership initiatives, this proposal is
likely to remain just that. See DEP'T Hous. URBAN DEV., OVERVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT's 2006
BUDGET, 167, 167 (2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/pdf/budget/hud.pdf.
276. Krzewinski, supra note 235, at 326.
277. Id.
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the vouchers has become increasingly important. Landlord discrimi-
nation against voucher-holders based on their source of income is a
large obstacle for tenants seeking available units, especially in lower
poverty areas. The difficulty that some voucher-holders have in find-
ing an available unit was illustrated by the experience of Ms. Sullivan-
Lackey.
In its opinion, the Illinois Appellate Court bolstered the Chicago
Commission on Human Relations's authority to interpret and enforce
the law by according the proper degree of deference to the agency.
Although the opinion is a bit short on reasoning, past Commission
decisions use proper legislative analysis to arrive at their interpreta-
tion that voucher-holders are a protected class under the law. An ex-
ploration of preemption analysis and alternative results demonstrates
that the court reached the right result.
The Chicago law, although not ideal, is a workable solution, provid-
ing a chance for change. It can be enforced locally and can provide a
legal recourse for voucher-holders who experience discrimination,
bolstered by the possibility of incurring fees and even punitive dam-
ages. The CHA's Plan for Transformation will provide benefits in the
form of increased availability of units and more attractive options for
former public housing residents who are forced to relocate. These fu-
ture changes, however, depend in large part on actions to promote
landlord participation and future courts' application of the de minimis
burden exception. Either factor has the potential to eliminate any
benefits gained by the newly supported law. Finally, because the law
and the court's holding apply only within the Chicago city limits, the
scope of its impact depends on the willingness of other municipalities
in Illinois and throughout the country to follow suit. And of course,
only limited change can be made if the underlying discriminatory atti-
tudes remain, perpetuating current housing patterns segregated by
race and class.
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